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HOUSE PRICES IN EUROPE
1. Introduction
House prices have risen rapidly in most EU member
states and in many other countries in recent years,
though not uniformly. Between 1992 and 2002 prices
in Ireland rose by 250 percent in nominal terms but in
western Germany by only 10 percent (ECB 2003 b,
Deutsche Bundesbank 2003).
Figure 5.1 illustrates the experience of the EU states.
Spanish house prices have risen steadily since that
country’s accession. House prices in Britain did not
recover their 1989 levels until 1997 but have risen
rapidly since then. French prices have been stable with
some recent rises.
Other states also show a variety of patterns. Finland
and Sweden experienced substantial price falls in the
early 1990s. House prices in the Netherlands rose very
rapidly through the 1990s, but this was the first coun-
try in which prices stalled after the recent boom. Italy
shows substantial increases but a volatile pattern. As
we emphasise below, however, the quality of the data
varies considerably across Europe and not too much
significance should be attached to these differences.
Since 2000, however, there have been significant rises
in all states except Germany and the Netherlands.
There is extensive discussion in the press of a house
price bubble and of the possibility of a house price
crash. However most such discussion simply reflects a
belief that what goes up may come down. More
sophisticated commentators note that multiples of
house prices to incomes are at historically high levels
in many places (for example IMF 2004). But this is an
indicator that house prices are
too high only if there is a “natur-
al” ratio of house prices to
incomes, to which prices will nec-
essarily revert. The ratio of typi-
cal mortgage interest payment to
income – a more immediate mea-
sure of affordability for most
households – is low as a result of
falls in nominal interest rates. A
view on the “appropriate”level of
house prices requires more exten-
sive analysis of both the demand
for housing services and the
nature of residential housing as
an asset category. 
In the UK, house price inflation
has become a central issue for
monetary policy. Within the
eurozone, the issues are different.
Despite the adoption of a com-
mon monetary policy, the hous-
ing markets of different member
states have behaved in divergent
ways. In Britain, Spain and
Ireland – which have seen the
most rapid escalation of house
prices – mortgage finance is gen-
EEAG Report 102
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1EEAG Report 103
Chapter 5
erally linked to short-term interest rates. In most
other eurozone countries, home loans are based on
long-term interest rates (although with considerable
variation in the terms of early repayment). As a
result, the housing markets of these countries may be
less sensitive to interest rate fluctuations.
These links between monetary policy and the housing
market mean that what happens to housing has a
macroeconomic significance greater than can be
attached to events in other product markets. This
gives wider significance to some fundamental ques-
tions about European housing. How far away is
Europe from a single housing market, in which the
determinants of house prices are similar in Helsinki
and Lisbon? Is there likely to be convergence between
price levels in different states, and at what rate? And
what are the implications of these housing market
issues for the wider process of economic integration? 
It is difficult to give even provisional, far less defini-
tive, answers to these questions. Our purpose instead
is to begin a description of the analytical framework
which is needed to investigate such questions and the
data which would need to be assembled to resolve
them. Given the importance of the housing market to
the European economy, it is
remarkable how little is under-
stood about its characteristics.
Few of the questions which are
extensively analysed in securities
markets have even been posed for
the housing market, and data on
house prices is not collected
across Europe on a comparable
basis. A great deal of knowledge
and information exists, both
among private businesses and in
government agencies, but it is not
assembled in any systematic fash-
ion. This is an appropriate task
for the European Central Bank.
In 2003 it published a prelimi-
nary study of house prices across
the fifteen then members of the
European Union. However the
quality of this information is very
uneven. There are many unre-
solved issues even in the interpre-
tation of the data.1 Nor do these
surveys allow meaningful com-
parisons of levels (as against
trends) of house prices between
countries. It is therefore not possible to begin an
assessment of the extent of convergence and diver-
gence within the eurozone.
2. The price of accommodation
The economic analysis of house prices, like all
prices, begins from supply and demand. Housing is
both a product and an asset class, and much of the
complexity of housing economics follows from this
duality.
House prices are an element of the total price of
accommodation, and Table 5.1 illustrates the vari-
Box 5.1
What is a bubble?
“If the reason the price is high today is only because investors believe that the
selling price will be high tomorrow – when ‘fundamental’ factors do not seem
to justify such a price – then a bubble exists” (Stiglitz 1990).
We broadly follow this definition, which helps to distinguish a bubble from a
period of overvaluation. A bubble has, as a necessary condition, a
predominance of “noise traders” – people whose trading behaviour is based on
considerations other than fundamental value. Examples of such behaviour are
momentum trading (chasing upward trends) or “technical analysis” (decisions
based on patterns supposedly detected from charts). Noise trading may also
result from simple ignorance or disregard of principles of asset valuation. This
latter factor is obviously important in housing markets, where most buyers and
sellers are inexperienced.
Because there is considerable uncertainty about fundamental values, there can
be wide disagreement and substantial fluctuations, which will with hindsight
include episodes of substantial overvaluation, even in the absence of noise
trading. A prevalence of noise trading is necessary, though not sufficient, for
the emergence of bubbles, in which prices lie outside the range of reasonable
estimates of fundamental value. Noise traders incur substantial risk of loss, but
trading during bubbles is also risky for investors who are not themselves noise
traders, and are aware of fundamental values, because once prices lose any
anchor on fundamental values there are no bounds to the range of their
possible fluctuation. In Keynes’ words, markets can be wrong for longer than
investors can stay solvent.
The distinction is complicated by the observation that even in extreme bubbles
purported rationalisations in terms of fundamental values are offered for
extravagant prices. As the investigations of New York State Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer showed of the dot-com boom, however, these rationalisations
were often not believed even by the authors themselves.
1 There are three broad classes of method of measuring house price
movements:
– average transactions prices, adjusted to reflect the mix of the hous-
ing stock
– repeat sales indices, based on sequential observations of sales of
the same property
– hedonic indices, which rely on regression analysis of the relation-
ship between prices and the characteristics of the housing stock.
Each measure is in principle different and in practice can give sub-
stantially different results. US data (see McCarthy and Peach, 2004)
show the repeat sales index increasing substantially faster than a
hedonic index, while in the UK in 2003 hedonic indices recorded
annual house price inflation at times 10 percent higher than mea-
sures based on average transaction prices. Thus even if the quality of
the base data is high (which is true for the UK and the US but not
for most European countries) the measurement of prices is subject to
considerable uncertainty.ous components of the cost of accommodation.
These costs are partly a function of the monetary
value of the house and partly a function of the size
of the house. The table calculates the total cost of
accommodation using three different figures for the
price of housing services. The total cost of accom-
modation, as a proportion of all household expen-
ditures, falls in a range 19 percent to 36 percent.
This is the key figure in considering the “affordabil-
ity” of housing.
The price of housing services is determined by the
supply of and demand for accommodation. As in all
markets, a fall in the price of accommodation leads
to an increase in demand for housing. What is meant
by increased demand for housing is complex, howev-
er, because houses are commodities with many
dimensions. The increase in demand for housing that
results from a fall in the price of accommodation or
housing sservices does not necessarily, or commonly,
take the form of a demand for more houses.
(Although it may do so as a result either of increased
demand for second homes or the formation of new
smaller households.).
Households may instead respond to a fall in the price
of housing by looking for more space, or a better
location, or a combination of the two. While addi-
tional houses may be in elastic supply, the capacity of
the construction industry to meet the demand for
more space in better locations is limited even in the
long run. Rising house prices do
not therefore necessarily stimu-
late a boom in new construction.
This multi-dimensional nature of
housing as commodity leads to the
wide diversity in the characteristics
of housing markets. In the central
areas of the United States, popula-
tion is sparse, and larger towns are
not necessarily organised on the
radial patterns common to
European towns and cities.
Shopping and commercial facili-
ties are dispersed rather than
focused on a central area.
Locational premia for proximity to
the centre are small and may, for
derelict downtown areas, be nega-
tive. Desirable residential areas are
generally simply those in which
other rich people choose to live.
In areas such as these housing is in essentially per-
fectly elastic supply. Prices are low and stable, mov-
ing in line with incomes (or building costs, which fol-
low a similar time series). In Iowa, for example, the
ratio of average house price to personal income per
capita varied only between 1.7 and 1.9 over the peri-
od 1985–2002 and the highest ratio was reached in
2002. In neighbouring Nebraska, the ratio was in the
range 1.8 to 2.1 over the same time period and the
peak of 2.1 was observed in 1985 (Case and Schiller
2003).
In coastal states of the US, and in Europe, typical
ratios of house prices to incomes are much higher and
more volatile. In Iowa or Nebraska, people are simply
buying shelter; in California or Munich, the locational
characteristics of a house have a major effect on
demand and hence on the price of housing services.
And in congested areas there are other reasons why a
house is more than a structure and a plot of land: it can
only function as a home with a supporting infrastruc-
ture – road access, utility connections, street cleaning
and waste collections, schools and medical facilities.
The provision of such infrastructure is costly and its
availability limited. Some of these infrastructure costs
are paid by the housebuilder or first occupier; others
fall on public authorities. But the value of the house
will reflect their quality and availability. In addition,
planning rules may restrict building even on land that
is in plentiful supply, creating “value” through the




The price of accommodation in euros (UK, Spain 2002)
(1 €= 0.675 GBP)
UK Spain
Maintenance and repairs 891 519
Utilities 1319 1043
Furnishings 1244 1005
Property taxes 1191 385
4645 2952
Cost of housing services – at 1% of capital
value of average house price 1852 1423
at 2% of capital value 3704 2846
at 5% of capital value 9259 7115
Total non housing household expenditure 25185 18745
Accommodation costs as % of all expenditure
– at 1% 21% 19%
– at 2% 25% 24%
– at 5% 36% 35%
Source: Office for National Statistics, UK (2002), Instituto Nacional de
Estadística,
http://www.catastro.minhac.es/estadistica/interactivo2/default.htm,
Ministerio de Fomento (2002).EEAG Report 105
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2.1 Locational characteristics
Attractive locational characteristics fall into three
main groups:
(i) Proximity to central commercial areas. Houses in
large cities command substantial premia and in
general the closer they are to the centre the larger
are these premia.
(ii) Scenery and climate. Certain areas are particular-
ly pleasant places to live.
(iii) Glamour. Certain areas are particularly fashion-
able – a “good address”. Such fashions may be
transitory but usually are not: a good address will
attract amenities which ensure that it retains that
aura. University towns often have these charac-
teristics.
The recent US house price boom has been concen-
trated in a small number of states: essentially, the
Northeast, California, and Hawaii (HSBC 2004a,
Case and Schiller 2003). These were already the states
with the highest ratio of house prices to per capita
income and they have experienced much greater
volatility of house prices than Midwestern states such
as Iowa and Nebraska. All these coastal or island
states enjoy at least one of the benefits of (i), (ii), and
(iii) above and, in the case of California, all three.
After Hawaii, California has the highest ratio of
prices to per capita income of any state of the Union
(ca. 9:1 in 2004).
There is wide – although not complete – agreement
among prospective buyers on what constitutes good
and bad locations. If the ranking of locational quali-
ty is objectively defined, and houses have already been
built in all the best available locations, Figure 5.2 illus-
trates how the price of housing services is determined.
OB represents the price of housing services in the best
location. At D, the poorest location at which it is
worth building, the cost of housing services is entire-
ly determined by construction costs, as in Iowa and
Nebraska.
The overall value of the housing stock is then
OABCD. The level of house prices is determined by
the level of building costs, OA, and the slope of the
location gradient, BC. For the UK, the average level
of house prices in 2004 is €225,000 (equal to about
nine times per capita income, as in California) and the
building cost of an average house (90 sq m) around
€100,000 (although the provision of associated ser-
vices may add up to 40 percent to the construction
cost of a dwelling). 
The area ABC then represents about 55 percent of the
value of the UK housing stock and can, as a first
approximation, be described as the value of UK
house building land: the area OACD, representing
about 45 percent of the value of the UK housing
stock can, as a first approximation, be described as
the value of the structures. 
The steepness of the gradient, BC, is determined part-
ly by the degree to which houses are differentiated by
locational quality – little in Nebraska, extensive in
London – and partly by the inequality of income.
Houses are what Fred Hirsch (1976) called a position-
al good. The richest people will always live in the best
houses, but the aspirations of poorer people will drive
up the price they have to pay. At the same time, com-
petition among the rich to secure the very best houses
will drive up their prices to reflect their ability to
afford them. 
An increase in demand for hous-
ing services might come either
from a demand for additional
housing space overall (as from
demographic factors) or from a
demand for the locational char-
acteristics that housing services
offer (people living in less
favoured locations using their
growing incomes to buy a more
convenient house). Demand for
structures can be satisfied by
additional house-building;
demand for positional compo-
nents cannot be, and simply leads
to an increase in the price of
these positional characteristics.
Figure 5.2The key feature of the positional good is that even if
the good can itself be replicated, the positional char-
acteristic cannot be. If Eaton Square is the “best
address”, and the number of houses in Eaton Square
doubles, then the title of “best address” attaches to a
subset of houses in Eaton Square (or transfers to an
altogether different location.)
This effect can partly be mitigated by substituting
space for the positional characteristics of houses –
households settle for a larger house in a less
favourable location – but this process leads to a steady
fall in the price of space relative to other characteris-
tics of houses. This is why it is easy in most European
countries to buy large but poorly located houses for
low prices per square meter of accommodation. 
European economies are more like California and
New York than Iowa and Nebraska. Average houses
in Europe fetch, on average, around ten times average
national per capita income. In the UK the average
house price is currently around €225,000, nine times
per capita income of €25,000; in Germany a represen-
tative row house costs €260,000, twelve times per capi-
ta income of €22,000.
2.2 Locational gradients
Among the larger EU members, two countries, France
and the UK, have a dominant city that is both the
political and commercial capital: Greater Paris and
Greater London are among the largest cities in
Europe, accounting for about one quarter of the pop-
ulation of these countries. In both states the gradient
of house prices slopes steeply towards the centre of
these cities and the most favoured areas within them
(Kensington/Belgravia, Paris VIII and XVI) have the
highest prices in Europe. In both countries there are
secondary, but much lower, peaks in secondary cities
such as Birmingham, and Lyon has a scenery and cli-
mate gradient towards the PACA (Provence – Alpes –
Côte d’Azur) region.
Germany, in contrast, has had no similarly dominant
city, and like Spain and Italy has different political
and commercial capitals. The most expensive German
city is Munich, which is a business centre, houses the
state government of Bavaria and benefits from
favourable scenery and climate. Munich house prices
are around 50 percent more than the all-German aver-
age (Deutsche Bundesbank 2003, Bulwien AG 2003),
which suggests that locational dispersion may be less
marked in western Germany than in France or Britain
(it seems inappropriate to include the East in these
comparisons).
Most of the population of the Netherlands is located
within the North Sea coastal strip, and the country
can be described as a linear city with numerous com-
mercial centres. The locational gradient found in the
Netherlands is correspondingly small: surveys suggest
(VROM, 2000–4) that at the peak of the Dutch house
price boom differentials between the various
provinces of Holland had virtually disappeared,
although the subsequent weakness of prices has
affected less favoured (less central) parts of the
Netherlands more than the congested areas of Nord
and Zuid Holland. In Britain, by contrast, house
prices in the most expensive region (London) average
two and a half times those in the cheapest (Scotland)
(Halifax, 2004).
3. Underlying influences on the supply and demand
for housing services
Houses take time to build, and the entire capacity of
a national construction industry cannot increase its
physical housing stock by more than, say, five percent
a year, and usually by much less. Thus, while the long
run elasticity of supply of shelter (structures) is very
high, the short run elasticity is low, although this elas-
ticity may be higher in smaller areas.
Within the overall parameters of population and
housing stock, translation of these figures into supply
and demand for housing depends on a number of fac-
tors. Some of these are cultural influences indepen-
dent of the housing market itself, but the price of
housing may in turn have some effect on these cultur-
al influences, such as the rate of household formation.
(a) Conversion of overall population into numbers of
households. This depends principally on the age
structure of the population: children tend to live
in households with adults, older people tend to
live in smaller households (as children leave home
and partners die). Cultural factors are relevant,
particularly the age at which children establish
their own households, the degree to which elderly
people live with children, and the rate of house-
hold dissolution through divorce and relationship
breakdown. These cultural factors are, in turn,
influenced by economic factors such as house
prices and overall income levels. 
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(b) The rate of depreciation and obsolescence of the
existing housing stock. Depreciation of the hous-
ing stock is of two kinds: physical depreciation,
the physical deterioration of housing through
time, weather and wear and tear; and economic
depreciation, any particular configuration of the
housing stock becomes less appropriate, over time,
for current needs. Economic depreciation is, in
turn, a function of a range of factors 
– other economic change (for example, shifts in
the location of industry, changes in the avail-
ability of communications or transport)
– changes in prices of other goods (for example,
energy, domestic servants, washing machines)
which change the relative attractiveness of dif-
ferent houses or the cost of housing relative to
other goods
– rising incomes (which raise expectations of, for
example, kitchen facilities, ambient temperature)
– changes in preferences (for example, demand
for rural versus urban locations, the identity of
glamour locations).
Thus, the rate of economic depreciation will depend
on the overall rate of economic growth and on trends
in the prices of goods complementary to housing.
The rate of economic depreciation will also depend
on the average age of the housing stock, which varies
substantially across Europe. Finland and Greece
have the youngest housing stock in Europe (probably
as a result of recent migration to urban areas), fol-
lowed by the Netherlands, whose stock suffered
extensive wartime damage. The UK has the oldest
housing stock. Eastern Germany and the ex-commu-
nist accession states have inherited a housing stock
prone to particularly rapid depreciation in both
physical and economic terms.
(c) Demand for second homes. This depends on
income inequality and cultural preferences.
Many Scandinavian households have small sum-
mer cottages. Country residences are fashionable
among affluent Londoners and Parisians (but
only affordable by the rich). Few Dutch or
German households have second homes in the
same country.
(d) The efficiency of utilisation of the housing stock.
In all countries, houses are empty because of
– economic obsolescence (see above)
– inefficiencies in the housing market: difficul-
ties in organising simultaneous sale and pur-
chases for owner occupiers, voids in the rental
sector, especially in the social housing sector.
4. The relationship between house prices and the
price of housing services
If a home provides a stream of services fixed in value
relative to the general price index and not subject to
depreciation, then the value of that house is the value
of that stream of housing services capitalised at the
long term real interest rate. Thus the long term real
interest is a key influence on the appropriate level of
house prices.
The recent rise in house prices should therefore be
seen in the context of a substantial rise in the price of
other assets, including the most directly comparable
asset class: long-dated indexed bonds. In the UK, the
earliest and largest issuer of these securities, real
yields have fallen from around four percent in the
mid-1990s to below two percent today. The UK mar-
ket has been influenced by some technical factors con-
nected with the funding of pension schemes, but there
have also been substantial rises in the prices of long-
dated indexed securities in other countries, including
the US – where Treasury Inflation-Protected Securi-
ties (TIPS) were first issued in 1997 – and in the prin-
cipal eurozone issuer, France.2 The first French long-
dated bond was issued in September 1998 to return
3.4 percent, and the yield on these securities has since
fallen to 2.4 percent. This factor alone is sufficient to
explain most of the rise in French house prices over
the period.
Indexed bonds are appropriately classed as riskless
assets because these securities allow complete hedging
of a desired consumption stream. However the price
of these securities has proved volatile in practice,3 and
this volatility translates into uncertainty about the
appropriate level of house prices. The yields obtain-
able on indexed bonds during the late 1990s seem high
relative not only to current yields but to conventional
expectations of long-term interest rates, including his-
toric bond yields in periods of low inflation. This may
be attributable to unrealistic expectations of future
equity returns during the stock market bubble associ-
ated with the “new economy”.
The future prospects for long-term interest rates
depend in large measure on the range of investment
opportunities and supply of savings in the world
2 The first French issues were linked to the French price level. Some
more recent issues are tied to European inflation.
3 If there were undated indexed bonds, their price would have been
more volatile still. The real present value of the repayment on a con-
ventional 30 year bond is low because it is fixed in nominal terms,
but that of a 30 year indexed bond, which is fixed in real terms, is
substantially higher.economy. The most important influences on these in
the short term are the large US budget deficit, aggra-
vated by the deterioration in the fiscal position of
European economies associated with the failure to
observe the Stability and Growth Pact, the substantial
savings being generated in East Asia and the invest-
ment opportunities generated by rapid economic
growth in India and China. On the other hand, any
resolution of the problem of US fiscal and trade
imbalances would be likely to lead to an increase in
savings and to greater demand for risk-free assets.
The housing market, however, is dominated by unso-
phisticated investors whose views on interest rates
may be little influenced by fundamental factors in the
world economy. Although it is these fundamental fac-
tors that underpin the long-term trend of house
prices, short-term movements will be more affected by
household expectations of interest rates, which will in
turn be influenced by the rates at which mortgages are
advertised. It is striking that the three European coun-
tries with the largest recent increases in house prices –
Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom – are coun-
tries in which mortgage finance is principally related
to short-term interest rates. In the two eurozone mem-
bers, these rates continue to be very low. In the UK,
the state of the housing market has been a major
influence on decisions by the Bank of England to
raise interest rates. The relationship between fixed and
variable rate mortgage finance and the housing mar-
ket is a major issue in the conduct of European mon-
etary policy (Miles 2004).
5. The characteristics of houses versus bonds
Houses do, however, differ significantly from indexed
bonds in their characteristic as assets. The most
important of these differences are risk, tax, physical
depreciation (through wear and tear for a house,
through impending maturity for a bond), economic
growth, economic depreciation or appreciation, trans-
actions and agency costs. We consider each of these
elements in turn. We do so for three types of houses –
one owned outright, one owned with a 75 percent
mortgage, and one owned for letting. We compare
these asset characteristics with those not only of
indexed bonds but also relative to commercial proper-
ty – retail, office and industrial and equities. For con-
creteness, we suggest specific values for the differences
in yield which might follow from the differences
between the characteristics of the asset classes. These
numbers are essentially illustrative, and alternative
values can readily be substituted in Table 5.2.
5.1 Risk
Within the capital asset pricing model, equities are
normally treated as the dominant asset class – risk is
measured relative to a market equity portfolio. A cur-
rent consensus puts the equity risk premium in the
range 300–500 basis points (see, for example, Dimson,
Marsh and Staunton 2002) All property asset classes
are correlated with equity prices, but not perfectly, and
property price movements show lower amplitude than
equity prices. We set the risk premium at four percent
for equities and two percent for rented property.
The position of owner occupiers is more complex. It
is difficult to construct a well diversified portfolio if,
as is true for most owner occupiers, one single element
accounts for more than 100 percent of net assets. But
this is not necessarily the correct perspective since a
house acts as a hedge against future housing costs.
This hedge may be very attractive, since the house is
the one the occupier has selected to live in. We assume
no risk premium for a house owned outright. 
A purchaser with a mortgage is exposed to greater
risk. Interest and repayment of capital are defined in
nominal terms, but the income stream from which
repayments are made will move broadly in line with
inflation, as will the value of the asset – the house –
against which the loan is secured. Higher than expect-
ed inflation helps wipe out the value of the debt, while
falling inflation – as in the 1990s – can mean that bor-
rowing to finance home ownership may be more bur-
densome than anticipated. If interest rates are vari-
able the home buyer is exposed to uncertainty about
the nominal value of repayments; if interest rates are
fixed, the home buyer is exposed to uncertainty about
their real value. However, the lack of interest in infla-
tion-linked mortgages suggests that this risk is not
perceived as very large. We set the premium associat-
ed with this inflation-related risk, rather arbitrarily, at
one percent.
5.2 Tax
The tax position varies across EU member states.
However investors in property and equities are nor-
mally subject to a tax on income and capital gains
from these assets. The tax is generally levied on nom-
inal income, although there may be some relief for
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capital gains. We have put tax at 100–200 basis points
for all these assets.
Some countries impose tax on the imputed income
from owner occupation, but many do not and where
tax is charged its basis is rarely onerous. Tax relief is
frequently denied or limited on interest paid on mort-
gage borrowing. Capital gains tax is not generally
paid by owner occupiers. We have set the tax at zero
for property owned outright and one percent for
owner occupiers with a 75 percent mortgage. The
most usual tax treatment of indexed bonds is that the
coupon is taxed but not the indexation of principal.
Tax here is estimated at 1/2 percent.
5.3 Economic growth
As a first approximation, rents and profits may be
expected to rise in line with overall economic growth.
It is not obvious whether output or per capita output
is more relevant. This figure has been set at 2 percent.
5.4 Physical and economic depreciation
Physical depreciation is the expenditure required to
maintain the physical characteristics of an asset.
Economic depreciation is the decline (or appreciation)
of the value of an existing asset with unchanged phys-
ical characteristics relative to newly produced versions
of that asset class.
Equities suffer no physical depreciation, but do expe-
rience economic depreciation because established
companies must continually give way to new ones,
and therefore (unless the overall profit share increas-
es) the profits of a fixed population of companies will
decline relative to national income. This economic
depreciation is set at one percent. Although actual
indexed bonds depreciate (because having been issued
at higher historic levels of real interest rates they gen-
erally stand at premia to their issue price in real
terms), the comparison made here is with hypotheti-
cal perpetual bonds.
For office and industrial properties, physical and eco-
nomic depreciation should be viewed together. These
structures are generally replaced before the end of
their physical lives because they can no longer be eco-
nomically adapted to changing business needs. The
combined effect is set here at five percent. Shops
depreciate less than other commercial properties
because much of their value lies in site rather than
structure.
Physical depreciation of houses relates to structures
but not land. In addition, houses are likely to experi-
ence economic appreciation because of increased
pressure on a relatively fixed supply of non-shelter
characteristics as incomes rise. Moreover, while mod-
ern industrial and office buildings are in almost all
cases preferred to older industrial and office proper-
ties, traditional characteristics of houses are often
positively valued. Taking all these factors together,
physical depreciation of two percent and economic
depreciation of zero is assumed for housing.
5.5 Transaction costs
These comprise taxes on property and share transac-
tions, legal costs, agency and brokerage fees, and
bid–offer spreads. Such charges vary considerably
across European countries. Amortised over a period of
years, these costs are set at one percent for all property.
Transactions costs are much lower for equities but
turnover much higher, and one percent is used here also.
Transactions costs for indexed bonds are negligible.
5.6 Agency costs
Agency costs are associated with property manage-
ment and more broadly with the information asymme-
tries and moral hazards of the type that owner occu-
pation avoids but are inescapable whenever ownership
and control of assets are in the hands of distinct par-
ties. Agency costs are set at one percent for all assets
except owner-occupied houses and indexed bonds.
For owner occupied property, the “required yield” of
Table 5.2 equates to the price of housing services
required in the measurement of the cost of accommo-
dation in Table 5.1. This figure equates to about
10 percent of total household expenditure. There is no
“natural” figure for this ratio. But such a figure is not
unmanageable in relation to overall household bud-
gets. None of the other “required yields” in Table 5.2
are obviously anomalous. These required yields are
towards the upper end of the range of yields current-
ly available for these asset classes in European mar-
kets, suggesting, plausibly, that most assets are cur-
rently somewhat expensive.
An analysis of this sort cannot hope to give a “cor-
rect” value for house prices. But some provisional
conclusions can be drawn.
a) The price of housing services is sensitive to quite
small changes in the assumptions of Table 5.2 andto changes in the economic environment. The
range of house prices that could be justified by ref-
erence to fundamental values is therefore quite
wide. House prices may therefore be expected to be
volatile around their long-term trend, and there is
sufficient uncertainty about that trend for it to be
difficult to identify clearly either over or under val-
uation.
b) The fundamental value of house prices in the long
run is particularly sensitive to the level of long
term real interest rates. It should therefore not be
surprising that the substantial reduction in real
interest rates from 1997 has been followed by sig-
nificant house price increases. There is no discus-
sion of a “bubble” in indexed bonds: indeed the
yields which were available on such bonds until the
late 1990s seem very high relative to historic expe-
rience, reflecting unrealistic expectations of returns
from equities as a result of the very real “bubble”
in stock markets. Current real yields are more con-
sistent with bond yields experienced in non infla-
tionary times. 
c) Following from this, the strength of house prices is
not surprising given the extent of gains in almost
all other asset markets. Even in the UK, which has
(apart from Ireland) experienced the most rapid
increases, it was only in 2004 – after four years in
which the trend of equity markets was down and
that of houses strongly upwards – that house price
increases matched share price increases after the
cyclical lows established in 1982.
d) There is no evidence of a ‘bubble’ in the housing
market comparable to the ‘bubble’ in technology
stocks in 1999-2000, or that in Japanese equities in
1985–89. In both these episodes, prices became
divorced from any realistic calculation of the
potential earnings capacity of the underlying asset
and purchasers were principally motivated by the
expectation that the paper they purchased could
rapidly be sold at a higher price to someone else.
House prices may currently be expensive but are
not fantastic, and most purchasers of houses make
these purchases with the intention of enjoying the
services of the properties they buy.
6. Tenure choice
There are large variations across Europe in tenure
choice. In Britain and Spain, over 70 percent of hous-
es are owner-occupied, but this figure is below half in
Germany and Switzerland. The countries with high
rates of owner occupation have experience of both
rapid and volatile inflation. High inflation tends to
increase the tax benefits of owner occupation because
the nominal yield on assets is taxable, and so the effec-
tive tax rate on real returns increases. The tax advan-
tage has this character because “imputed income”
from housing is tax free or lightly taxed; the tax bur-
den is lower if the owner and occupier are the same
person and is greater at higher inflation rates. This tax
advantage is increased if nominal mortgage interest
payments are wholly or partly tax deductible, and if
capital gains by owner occupiers are tax free. Volatile
inflation increases the hedging benefits from owner
occupation (although it also increases the risks to
which mortgage borrowers who match a nominal
repayment stream with a real income stream are
exposed).
However, as is evident from Table 5.2, owner occu-















Risk 0 100 200 200 200 200 400
Tax 0 100 150 150 150 150 150
Growth -200 -200 -200 -200 -200 -200 -200
Physical and economic
depreciation
200 200 200 300 500 500 100
Transactions costs 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Agency costs 0 0 100 100 100 100 100
Total 100 75
1) 550 650 850 850 650
Post tax real yield on
indexed bonds
150 150 150 150 150 150 150
Required yield 250 225 700 800 1000 1000 800
Note:
1) 25% of 300
Source: EEAG.EEAG Report 111
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tenancy, offering tax advantages and eliminating
agency costs. Against this, transactions costs are
lower in the rental sector for people who move fre-
quently, and gaps in the credit market may make
owner occupation difficult for some households.
There will always be some low-income households
that are unattractive to any lender. Often, these
householders will not be sought after as tenants
either. This market segment is handled everywhere
through social housing.
Because mortgage lending is offered on much more
attractive terms than other consumer lending,
household cash flow profiles are substantially influ-
enced by the practices of mortgage lenders. This was
particularly important during the period of rapid
inflation (and associated high nominal interest
rates), when initial mortgage repayments were high
but fell rapidly in real terms because repayments
were nominally fixed in nominal values for the term
of the mortgage. Today, initial repayments are lower
(relative to the size of the mortgage) but decline
much more slowly over the life of the mortgage.
Thus nominal interest declines are likely to have had
an influence on prices as well as drops in real inter-
est rates.
A further complication arises through the calculation
of depreciation in the owner occupier segment. While
a house may have an indefinite life, its owner occu-
piers do not: in this sense an owner-occupied house
may be perceived as a depreciating asset.
There are two extreme assumptions:
– Households behave as if they live forever, if not lit-
erally then in the shoes of their children/grand-
children
– Households regard their house as worthless on the
death of the last partner.
In the latter case, such households should aim to die
with zero net assets. It does not appear that many
households do this, which suggests that the first
assumption may be closer to the truth, although it
may also reflect the limitations of institutional
arrangements allowing old people to realise the cap-
ital locked into their houses. People can sell their
houses and rent equivalent property with the pro-
ceeds of a purchased annuity, but this is not particu-
larly attractive either logistically or financially. There
are schemes of equity release that allow people to
borrow against the security of their house with
repayment at death. Other schemes involve sale with
life tenancy.
7. The future of house prices
The behaviour of technology stocks in the period
1997–2000 represented one of the largest speculative
bubbles in history, ranking along with Japanese stocks
and real estate in the 1980s, Florida land speculation
in the 1920s, railways and railroad booms in the nine-
teenth century, and Dutch tulip mania. It is this recent
experience that causes talk of a housing “bubble”.
There is no such bubble in the European housing mar-
ket. There may be an element of overvaluation, al-
though that is not clear either.
This does not mean that expectations do not have
an influence on house prices. They do, and from the
analysis of Table 5.2, they should. There is clear
evidence from the United States that expectations
have been unreasonable, and this has an upward
impact on current prices which will some day be
removed.
In common with other markets that have speculative
influences, house prices exhibit a pattern of positive
serial correlation in the short run and mean reversion
in the long run. Specifically, this means that if prices
rose last month, then they are more than averagely
likely to rise next month – but that if sufficiently long-
time scales are examined, periods in which prices rise
by more than the long-term trend are followed by
periods in which prices rise by less than the long-term
trend.
The reason this information is even less useful than
it sounds is that while such patterns can be identi-
fied with hindsight, the interval at which the short
run becomes the long run is not fixed. Therefore
while it is possible to assert with considerable confi-
dence that the current period of rapid house price
inflation will be followed by a period of slow or
even negative house price rises, there is no good way
of predicting whether that period will start tomor-
row or in three years’ time. And from the perspec-
tive of someone who is thinking of buying a house
today – and seeks an answer to the question – that
difference is crucial.
The available data does not allow us to make con-
fident statements about the relative levels of prices
in different European countries. This is an impor-
tant question, and European agencies should
undertake the data collection which would make it
possible. There is some evidence of convergence
during the house price boom. For example, the gapbetween apparently high prices in Germany and
significantly lower prices in the Netherlands has
narrowed, and Ireland and Spain, with particularly
rapid rises, seem to have started from a low base.
But this reflects processes of internal adjustment
within the countries themselves rather than the
convergence at the level of Europe, or the eurozone,
as a whole.
8. Conclusions
1. The level of house prices in Europe today is not
manifestly out of line with fundamental values.
House prices at current levels do not impose demands
on household budgets which are unsustainable, nor
do they seem substantially inconsistent with valua-
tions currently applied to other assets.
2. The range of uncertainty about the “correct” level
of house prices is very wide. House prices will contin-
ue to be volatile and it is possible, but not at all cer-
tain, that from a long term perspective current values
will appear high.
3. The present period of rapidly rising house prices
will be followed by a period in which house prices rise
very slowly and may even fall. Such a period might be
about to start, it may have already started, or it may
not.
4. People who make confident projections of future
house price trends (“house price inflation will slow
later this year”, ‘”house prices are 20 percent overval-
ued”) have no scientific basis for the knowledge they
claim. But they may be right anyway.
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